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Abstract
This article focuses on the rise of domestic 
outsourcing in the high-tech industry in the Galilee 
in northern Israel. Outsourcing has emerged as a self-
proclaimed mode of development targeting Palestinian 
citizens of Israel. This industry has expanded 
significantly in the past decade, attracting lucrative funds 
from public and private sources, and it has received 
widespread acclaim. Firms in this industry tend to have 
ties to the Israeli security establishment, a key player 
in the architecture of high-tech in Israel. At the same 
time, a Palestinian capitalist class has coalesced around 
this industry, embracing the discourse of technology 
and globalization as forms of self-empowerment. I 
argue that separation—in terms of wages and physical 
spaces—is a core operational characteristic within this 
industry, yet firms simultaneously invoke development 
as part of their organizational cultures, particularly 
the integration of Palestinian labor into the Israeli 
economy, empowerment of women, and peacemaking. 
Locating the practice of domestic outsourcing within 
a history of subcontracting to the Galilee, I illustrate 
that this “new” and “innovative” industry builds on 
established patterns that reinscribe Palestinian workers 
as a cheaper labor force. These practices illustrate the 
intertwinement of inclusion and exclusion within 
neoliberal economic development as well as the mutual 
production of Palestinians of 1948 as subjects of Israeli 
capitalism and colonialism.
Keywords: outsourcing, development, high-tech, 
Israel/Palestine, labor
Introduction
Since the end of the second intifada, the Israeli 
government has accelerated policies aiming to de-
velop and integrate Palestinian citizens (also known as 
Palestinians of 1948, or Arab-Israelis). Currently rep-
resenting 23 percent of Israeli citizens, this population 
is comprised of Palestinians who remained on their 
land in 1948 during the mass exodus of Palestinians 
known as the Nakba. They subsequently became cit-
izens of Israel, although they remain marginalized 
(Yiftachel 2006). Development takes place along-
side enduring exclusion, evinced in legislation and 
public rhetoric. Such intertwinement of inclusion 
and exclusion is not paradoxical but has historically 
been central to a process of colonialism, described by 
Shira Robinson in the Israeli context as resulting in 
a “liberal settler state” (2013). This article explores 
the emergence of domestic outsourcing, a highly ac-
claimed mode of development towards Palestinians of 
1948. Among outsourcing firms, separation is a core 
operational characteristic, yet they simultaneously 
invoke developmental objectives—the integration of 
Palestinian labor into the Israeli economy, empower-
ment of women, and peacemaking—within their orga-
nizational cultures. These practices are not dissonant; 
they illustrate the intertwinement of the mutual dy-
namics of inclusion and exclusion, while reinscribing 
and reproducing Palestinians as a cheaper labor force.
Outsourcing firms have been established in pre-
dominantly Arab areas in Israel, such as the Galilee in 
the north, using public and private funding sources. 
Advertised as a new and innovative model for Palestinian 
employment and increased Arab-Jewish collabora-
tion, many firms are led by Palestinian entrepreneurs, 
working closely with Jewish capital and connections. 
A key objective of domestic outsourcing is integrating 
Palestinians into Israel’s high-tech economy, enabling 
them to take part in the so-called “Start-Up Nation,” 
referring to Israel’s large number of start-ups per capita 
described in a best-selling book on Israel’s “economic 
miracle” (Senor and Singer 2009).
Although domestic outsourcing promulgates 
a mission of economic empowerment and political 
coexistence in the Galilee, it also represents a con-
tinuation of a history of segregation. While situating 
the rise of domestic outsourcing as a developmental 
project within the nexus of neoliberalism and security, 
I concurrently historicize the phenomenon as a rein-
carnation of previous waves of subcontracting to the 
Galilee, such as the textiles industry. The difference 
is that contemporary firms are tapping into a pool of 
skilled labor, such as university graduates, that has not 
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been absorbed by the Israeli market, rather than, for 
example, the unskilled labor embodied by women in 
sweatshops or construction workers. As domestic out-
sourcing arrangements are formulated according to a 
profit-maximizing regime of cost-efficient and flexible 
labor (Harvey 2005, 100; Mills 2003), the cheapness 
of Arab labor in these projects is not inadvertent. 
Rather, it is at the core of their establishment.
Labor markets are produced and structured via 
social and political processes (Block 1990; Fligstein 
2001; Peck 1996). Patterns of domestic outsourcing 
indicate a political process that, despite an emphasis on 
en-skilling, enframes Arab workers as a secondary labor 
force, i.e., characterized by inferiority vis-à-vis the pri-
mary labor market. Cheaper labor is not only about the 
lower wages of Palestinian workers but also about the 
larger political patterns within which they are engulfed. 
The underlying schisms within the labor market are a 
constitutive feature of the outsourcing project, discern-
ible in the operational activities of the firms, which are 
built on separation in wages and spaces.
I focus on the interactions between this separa-
tion and three discourses espoused by outsourcing 
firms as part of their developmental cultures. The first 
pertains to the employment of Palestinians, particu-
larly in high-tech, which illustrates the continued se-
curitization of Palestinian labor. The precarity faced 
by Palestinian workers is further structured by a gen-
dered component, the second discourse espoused by 
the outsourcing industry, which frames Palestinian 
women as “traditional” (Sa’ar 2017). The third is 
peacemaking. Emerging during Israel’s neoliberal re-
structuring in the mid-1980s, peacemaking grew in 
prominence in the 1990s during the Oslo period, but 
it did not dissipate after the second intifada. Instead, 
the discourse of peacemaking has become entangled 
with that of developmental praxis. The intersections 
between gender, class, and ethnonational identity are 
essential to understanding the distinct experiences of 
Arab workers (Walby et al. 2012), as is the overarch-
ing presence of a colonial dynamic between the Israeli 
state and the indigenous Palestinian population in the 
Galilee (Sa’di 2003).
After describing the methodology, I next outline 
the main characteristics of the industry, contextual-
izing its rise alongside previous patterns of subcon-
tracting and relating its contemporary manifestation 
to other subjects of neoliberal development, namely 
ultra-Orthodox Jewish women. I proceed to highlight 
the ways in which domestic outsourcing operates ac-
cording to principles of separation and perpetuates 
segregation. This is followed by a critical investiga-
tion of firms’ self-proclaimed developmental aspi-
rations pertaining to labor and security, gender, and 
peacemaking. The conclusion explores the politics of 
cheaper labor.
Methodology and Context
My ethnographic site is the Galilee in northern 
Israel, where clusters of Palestinians live. I focus on the 
outsourcing sector in Nazareth and surrounding areas, 
dubbed the “Arab high-tech hub” in Israeli media, be-
tween 2008 and 2015. I carried out open-ended dis-
cussions with individuals working in the outsourcing 
industry alongside semi-structured interviews with 
managers and architects of outsourcing projects. In 
addition, I critically analyzed the discourses of firms 
on their official websites and their representations in 
the press in Arabic, Hebrew, and English.
The firms discussed in this article follow an ethos 
of development, presenting their enterprises as pre-
liminary steps towards Arab-Jewish economic integra-
tion. They are not subsidiaries of Israeli companies 
but independent firms that offer outsourcing services 
to multiple clients. Also known as home-shoring, on-
shore outsourcing, or outsourcing to remote domestic 
locations, domestic outsourcing is a new term for the 
long-standing practice of subcontracting to a third party 
in the same country (Oshri et al. 2015, 32). The prac-
tice is attributed to the incremental decline of global 
labor arbitrage due to rising wages in offshore desti-
nations. Higher labor costs incurred by “re-shoring” 
are offset by lower expenditure on transportation 
and shortened supply chains. Economic nationalism 
constitutes a core part of the branding for domes-
tic outsourcing firms: for instance, Nazareth-based 
NCS Software Services proclaimed itself to be “blue- 
and-white [the colors of the Israeli flag] for the benefit 
of the client, the state, the economy, and Israeli in-
dustry” [kaḥol-lavan le-toʿelet ha-laḳoaḥ, ha-medinah, 
ha-kalkalah ṿe-hataʿaśiyah ha-yiśra’elit], stressing that 
all its activities were carried out within Israel and that 
all its employees and any external bodies it contracted 
were Israeli professionals.
Domestic outsourcing is a global phenomenon 
that is not exclusive to Israel. There are firms in the 
southern United States, for example, that offer simi-
lar services (see Pearce 2014). There is a geographic 
element in Israel as well, between the center and pe-
riphery, terms that reflect both geography and power 
imbalance. Firms located in the center can save 
around 30 percent by outsourcing to engineers in 
the north. This savings is attributed to competitive 
wages, lower production costs, lower municipal taxes, 
and government subsidies. Domestic outsourcing in 
high-tech emerged as a way to reduce outsourcing 
to engineers outside the country (in India, China, 
and Eastern Europe, for example), estimated to cost 
Israel an annual US $3 billion (Kloosterman 2009). 
Tapping into the potential within the country’s bor-
ders was the rationale behind the establishment of 
domestic outsourcing operations by leading fig-
ures in Israeli high-tech, mostly from the security 
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establishment. Dozens of outsourced tech firms have 
emerged in Nazareth alone. The geographic proxim-
ity of the Galilee to central Israel means that trans-
portation costs remain constant while firms profit 
from a cheaper labor force that is familiar with the 
language, operates under the same legal system and 
time zone, and has a corresponding level of political 
and economic stability.
An indigenous Palestinian capitalist class has co-
alesced around the emerging architecture of domes-
tic outsourcing. As both beneficiaries and subjects of 
colonialism, indigenous capitalists attain unique, and 
often paradoxical social positions (Birla 2009; Vitalis 
1990); therefore, their activities offer insights into class 
structures and class formation. Members of this class 
fetishize globalization and champion entrepreneurial-
ism as a solution to Palestinian marginalization, re-
sembling the emerging “corporate moral economy” 
of software professionals observed in India (Upadhya 
2016). Business leaders become moral and politi-
cal icons, transforming corporate technologies into 
forms of social development (Upadhya 2016). Taking 
advantage of lucrative resources in the development 
industry, in Israel and globally, this class imbues its 
capitalist endeavors with developmental undertones.
The outsourcing industry has benefited from 
the architecture of previous subcontracting patterns. 
Textile subcontractor Delta employed thousands of 
Palestinian women between the 1970s and 1990s 
(Drori 2000, 214; Sawt al-Amil 2008; Shehadeh and 
Khalidi 2014, 125). After Delta’s plants in the Galilee 
shut down (though the firm remains in business else-
where), its managers established a new entity in 2008, 
called Babcom, which contains an outsourcing tech 
center among other services. The firm was taken over 
in 2011 by Israeli outsourcing giant Matrix, which 
describes itself as “the first Zionist local offshore 
outsourcing” firm (Algazi 2006, 27). Announcing 
the deal, Israeli newspaper Haaretz described it as 
“the first exit [takeover] of an Israeli-Arab high-tech 
company [by a Jewish-Israeli firm]” (Hirschauge 
and Mittelman 2011), attesting to the importance of 
Palestinian indigenous capitalists as intermediaries 
and stakeholders in domestic outsourcing processes.
Articulations of development by outsourcing 
firms are encoded with a civilizing mission, a sense of 
duty to address the cultural or religious practices of mi-
nority groups via integration into capitalist structures. 
Perceived as a burden on the contemporary neoliberal 
state, Palestinians and ultra-Orthodox Jews have be-
come the principal subjects of development, resulting 
in a plethora of policy proposals discussing ways to in-
tegrate their labor (e.g., OECD 2018, 10–11). The in-
tegration of their labor into the private sector is tied to 
familiar cultural categories of modernity, linking em-
ployment to productivity and responsibility in society 
and casting the unemployed as “non-citizens” (Flint 
2009). Women’s employment, in particular, has been 
tied to emancipation (Abu-Lughod 1998).
Hundreds of ultra-Orthodox women have worked 
at the Talpiot center in the settlement of Modi’in ‘Illit 
(Frenkel and Wasserman 2016; Raz and Tzruya 2017). 
Talpiot is also run by Matrix, but Arabs and ultra- 
Orthodox Jewish women are not employed in the same 
place. Each group operates in a segregated tech hub. 
Subsidized by the government, which pays roughly 
one-fifth of employees’ salaries, Talpiot is a testament 
to the political role of outsourcing and development 
in service of Zionism. It illustrates the intertwinement 
of settlements within Israeli economic circuits, which 
become part of a leading Israeli industry, thereby fur-
ther consolidating control over occupied territory. It is 
an indication, as Gadi Algazi argues, that Israeli cap-
italism can be “both colonial and digital, and move 
back and forth between global markets and colonial 
settlements, and between campaigns for unbridled 
privatization and heavy government subsidies” (2006, 
37). Domestic outsourcing represents the nexus be-
tween neoliberal development, formulated according 
to regimes of flexible labor, and enduring colonial pat-
terns, exemplified by military networks.
Operational Separation
The model of domestic outsourcing is based 
on the presence and maintenance of separation be-
tween the core and periphery industries. The pursuit 
of profit is based on the exploitation of workers in the 
periphery, although it is also deeply interwoven with 
an ethos of development, affecting employment, gen-
der, and peacemaking.
The logic of outsourcing is straightforward: firms 
increase their profit margins by reducing expenditure 
on wages, which usually represent the bulk of their 
costs. The industry is premised on the assumption of 
a wage differential, that salaries of employees in out-
sourced plants are lower than the salaries of employ-
ees in-house. There is a stark difference between the 
wages of employees in high-tech in Nazareth and the 
salaries of employees working in high-tech areas near 
Tel Aviv. According to figures from Israeli business 
newspaper Calcalist, the wage of an employee at the 
junior level in Nazareth is 35–40 percent less than the 
wage of an employee in central Israel (Gilad 2011). 
At a more senior level, it can be up to 50 percent less 
(Gilad 2011). In 2014, interlocutors who had recently 
started told me they received a monthly wage that was 
around 30–55 percent below the average starting sal-
ary in high-tech in Israel.
Wages have generally not equalized. Rather, the 
fluctuation and evolution of the two industries appear 
to move at different scales. The high-tech sector in the 
center has experienced consistent growth, with salaries 
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rising progressively. In 2014, the average employee re-
ceived a pay rise of 5.4 percent, the fifth straight year 
of salary increases in the industry and the largest in-
crease in a single year in recent history (Orpaz 2015). 
Israeli business magazine Globes described 2014 as a 
“peak year for high tech in almost every parameter: 
financing, stock exchange offerings, exits and demand 
for programmers” (Hoffman 2015). This trend contin-
ued into 2017, prompting fears that the bubble might 
burst (Dover 2017). If the high salaries were the mo-
tivation behind outsourcing, their continuous increase 
would be counterintuitive. From a classical economic 
perspective, the rise in salaries suggests that the de-
mand for skilled labor in high-tech is higher than the 
supply, but this is not the case, given the number of 
unemployed or underemployed Palestinian graduates 
and those who are working in the outsourced sector. At 
the same time, the cost of labor has not been affected 
by the parallel outsourcing industry that has grown 
since 2008, nor do jobs in this sector seem threatened.
The incorporation of structural economic data 
(e.g., wage gaps or supply and demand) does not only 
demonstrate that the free market contains fundamen-
tal discrepancies and dysfunctionality but also enables 
one to link the machinations of classical economic the-
ory meaningfully to political and cultural phenomena. 
It demonstrates that the market is conditioned by sep-
aration. Palestinian labor is perceived as external to the 
available skilled labor pool. Palestinian workers are re-
cruited to different jobs with different wage scales and 
arguably a different economy altogether. This separa-
tion not only demystifies the link between wages and 
the theoretically apolitical principles of the free market 
but also, and more importantly, confirms that the two 
sectors operate as if in different worlds. Workers in the 
high-tech industry in the center continue to be pro-
tected from competition by workers in the periphery.
Labor segmentation is not accidental. Rather, it 
tends to be orchestrated and institutionalized by the 
state through capitalist structures (Burawoy 1981). 
Theorizing the distinct trajectory of Palestinian po-
litical economy in Israel, scholars have described the 
Palestinian labor market as a secondary labor market, 
with lower wages and greater insecurity (Khattab and 
Miaari 2013). Palestinian economic activity has also 
been described as operating in an “ethnic enclave” 
(Schnell et al. 1995). Palestinian employment and in-
dustrial development faced stringent limitations due 
to the imposition of martial law until 1966, along with 
policies that explicitly aimed to protect Jewish indus-
try (Rosenhek 2003). This was followed by a period in 
which Palestinian labor was subjected to “flexible uti-
lization,” employment that was contingent upon con-
ditions of Jewish workers (Shalev 1989), which led to 
the creation of ethnicized and gendered labor markets 
(Samed 1976). New industrial arrangements, such as 
domestic outsourcing, entrench and capitalize on such 
circumstances, particularly the wage disparity, known 
as an “ethnic penalty” (Miaari and Khattab 2013).
None of my interlocutors who worked in out-
sourcing firms seemed to perceive the salaries of 
Jewish high-tech workers as a benchmark for their 
own wage scales. Although multiple interlocutors 
cited low pay as their main criticism of the firms, 
they did not mention the divergence in pay with their 
Jewish counterparts in the center until I raised it. In 
response, a female engineer contended that it would 
be “odd” (using the Hebrew word muzar) to expect 
the same wages, as the business model of outsourcing 
would not make sense. Generally, most of my inter-
locutors were not overtly critical either of the firms or 
of the phenomenon of outsourcing, though they were 
aware of the discrepancy between receiving low pay 
and being advertised as professionals.
Outsourcing firms proclaim to be enskilling 
Palestinian workers. For example, on its website, 
Galil Software declares itself as the “place to be” for 
those looking for a career in Israeli high-tech, as the 
firm facilitates long-term careers in high-tech, work 
in the sector in Israel and abroad, and learning new 
technologies. It features testimonials from employees, 
including one who highlights learning “the most ad-
vanced tools and methodologies in today’s market.” 
Rebuffing proclamations that outsourcing firms are 
enskilling Palestinians, one engineer described the 
low wages as proof that working in the outsourced 
tech industry does not actually amount to a career but 
represents a bridge to the high-tech industry. Aware 
of the limitations of working in the outsourced sector 
but seeking to leverage its benefits to her favor, her 
ultimate objective was to leave the firm to pursue a 
career in high-tech. In this formulation, the high-tech 
hub in Nazareth operates as a back-door entrance to 
the high-tech industry in the center, enabling employ-
ees to interact with and experience high-tech from 
an external position. This illustrates that employees 
themselves take part in, and sustain, the mechanisms 
of operational separation.
The location of firms in the value chain is not only 
linked to wage differentials but also to the configura-
tion of spaces. Outsourcing firms and client firms in-
teract in a “hybrid workspace” (Halford 2005), which 
enables the establishment of a virtual professional en-
counter using intangible flows and processes, yet it also 
internalizes and projects operational separation. The 
cornerstone of this joint workspace in the outsourcing 
industry is its ability to mediate between spatial dis-
junctures, re-imagining geographic separation with-
out reconfiguring the polarized division of labor and 
physical segregation. In its efforts to define relations of 
production, the workspace dictates a continued divi-
sion between the labor groups. Similar to earlier cases 
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of sub-contracting, the outsourcing industry operates 
on the sidelines of the Israeli economy, adhering to a 
binary in which the Israeli economy remains distinct 
from the “Third World” Palestinian population.
Operational separation does not imply that there 
is no contact. Rather, it points to a specific type of 
contact that reinforces segregation. Mediating insti-
tutions and figures such as managers who have di-
rect contact or influence in organizing and arranging 
connections—in this case, between the outsourced 
and non-outsourced sectors—become essential to 
the entire arrangement (Smith and Neuwrith 2008). 
Although many of my interlocutors were enthusiastic 
about, and even proud of, the nascent Nazareth tech 
scene, some nevertheless expressed a degree of skepti-
cism about its ability to spur innovation independently, 
in line with its perception as a temporary path to high-
tech in the center. A male engineer with three years 
of experience was concerned that the industry is de-
veloping in an inward-facing, ghettoized form and is 
therefore not attuned to global tech patterns.
Furthermore, several firms refer to their activi-
ties as “near-shoring” on their official websites. Matrix 
Global advertises “offshore/nearshore services,” while 
Galil Software’s main page declares the firm as “your 
Israeli near-shore R&D partner.” A term with transna-
tional connotations, near-shoring is typically used in 
reference to offshore outsourcing by firms to a nearby 
location (such as from the US to Mexico or from 
Europe to North Africa). The term reveals the mental 
map in which outsourcing in Israel functions: in firms’ 
official descriptions, the Galilee is almost as if in an-
other country, albeit under direct Israeli control and 
actively supporting Israeli capitalism. It is close but 
distant, evoking the converging processes of inclusion 
and exclusion.
The virtual professional encounter of the work-
space becomes the prescribed method for exchanges 
and transactions, giving the illusion that the two sides 
are moving towards interconnectedness while ensur-
ing they remain separate. Using new technologies, a 
workspace, in theory, overcomes distances and enables 
closer connections between economies, yet it simulta-
neously incentivizes the continued peripheralization 
of outsourced workers. Spatial disjuncture is a fea-
ture of this development project: it brings Palestinian 
spaces into the Israeli economy while keeping them 
separate and dependent, ensuring continued Israeli 
control over the Galilee.
While segregation and separation are a funda-
mental part of the operations of domestic outsourc-
ing, they are inextricably intertwined with cultures 
of development. The combination of operational 
separation with development illustrates the com-
plex ways in which outsourcing ensures the contin-
ued precarity of Palestinian labor. As they deepen 
segregation and profit from cheaper labor, firms 
invoke developmental ideals. The rest of the article 
delves deeper into the cultures of development that 
shape, and are shaped by, operational separation in 
labor practices: employment and securitization, gen-
der, and peacemaking.
Development, Employment, and Security
The provision of employment to Palestinian 
workers in the periphery is one of the main develop-
mental objectives of outsourcing firms, but it cannot 
be discussed independently of the securitization of 
Palestinian labor and the presence of the Israeli mil-
itary establishment in high-tech. The overarching se-
curitization of Palestinian labor is a key rationale for 
the creation of a parallel outsourcing industry, thereby 
ultimately sustaining separation.
Military service is heavily entangled with dis-
courses on labor. Since Palestinians generally do not 
serve in the military and therefore do not have secu-
rity clearances, they are often excluded from jobs under 
the pretext of security. Recognized as an institution 
of social mobility and inclusion, the military provides 
material perks and socioeconomic mobility, com-
pelling some Palestinians to enlist (Kanaaneh 2008, 
35–49). Job advertisements sometimes state explicitly 
that employers are seeking an employee “after the army” 
(aḥarey ha-tsava). For example, a position advertised 
by the Airports Authority in the transportation sector 
included the precondition of army service, though it 
mostly requires handling baggage (Adalah 2013).
The role of military networks in domestic out-
sourcing is exemplified by Hybrid, which works with 
outsourcing firms. Hybrid was established in 2016 to 
boost Arab participation in high-tech, in cooperation 
with the Nazareth Business Incubator and alumni of 
the Intelligence Corp’s Unit 8200, a cybersecurity 
unit notorious for spying on Palestinians. Funded by 
the Ministry of Economy and Industry in partnership 
with the Authority for Arab Economic Development 
in the prime minister’s office with an annual budget of 
NIS 1.5 million (US $385,300), the program selects 
ten start-ups to receive support and mentorship on 
developing their businesses, raising capital, and forg-
ing contacts to enter the tech market.
The high-tech industry in Israel contains an 
underlying militarism enmeshed with a modernist- 
capitalist cosmology (Tawil 2015). Events displaying 
high-tech innovation centered on technology’s ability 
to defy and defeat nature—e.g., turning “night into 
day” or “controlling weather” (Tawil 2015, 225). 
Furthermore, “military capital,” defined as a result 
of a socialization process into the military system, is 
a key variable in Israeli high-tech (Swed and Butler 
2015). Many figures involved in high-tech in Israel, 
overwhelmingly Jewish males, are veterans of elite 
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Israeli military units and have been less inclined to hire 
outsiders. Considered a “founding father” of Israeli 
high-tech, Itsik Danziger, who was the chairman of 
Galil Software, described the industry as based on 
“social ties, and also of shared service in certain mili-
tary units,” arguing “of course, your average [Jewish] 
Israeli executive is not going to recruit an Arab engi-
neer he does not know” (Arlosoroff 2010). Palestinian 
exclusion from high-tech is depicted as a result of a 
lack of social networks and capital, nurtured in the 
army, rather than a reflection of a continuing colonial-
ism, in which Palestinian citizens—their bodies, land, 
and economic activities—are subjects of military con-
trol. This is a fundamental contrast with outsourcing 
to ultra-Orthodox Jewish women who do not serve in 
the army but are not subjected to the same patterns of 
securitization.
Those employed in the outsourced tech sector 
continued to associate the Israeli intelligence with mil-
itary practices, even as aspects of it have become known 
to them through technology and jobs. Discussing the 
role of veterans of Unit 8200 in Nazareth’s high-tech 
industry, interlocutors highlighted the normalization 
of militarization in Israeli society and in their lives, 
suggesting that the presence of military figures in 
the outsourcing industry is not out of the ordinary. 
These patterns align with the description of opera-
tional separation as an encounter in itself, a type of 
contact that entails continued control over the Galilee, 
part of larger—and seemingly mundane—practices of 
disciplining Palestinians. A young female engineer ar-
gued that even if intelligence figures were not physi-
cally present, they would be behind the scenes of the 
industry, implying that they would indirectly influ-
ence and monitor the work. This is partly because the 
high-tech industry is known to be strategic, and partly 
because Palestinians tend to be perceived as a threat 
regardless of their occupation. Another interlocutor, 
a male engineer with several years of experience in 
high-tech, responded to enquiries about cooperation 
between the military intelligence and high-tech firms 
by reminding me that “to speak of high-tech in Israel 
is to speak of the military,” while contending that as a 
young Palestinian man working in high-tech, it is pref-
erable to have volunteered in the army, as it “makes 
you appear more trustworthy” and results in career 
advantages.
There is a history of employment being con-
tingent upon loyalty and engulfed in systems of pa-
tronage, a practice that continues to manifest itself in 
new arrangements. In the first decade of statehood, 
employment was routinely used as a reward, with in-
formants likely to receive jobs (Sa’di 2014, 82, 140). 
Zionist institutions such as the Histadrut, Israel’s labor 
union, have historically undermined Palestinian work-
ers: in 1976, the Histadrut indicated that Palestinians 
who participated in the Land Day demonstrations 
and strikes would face reprisals, including dismissal 
from their jobs (Badarne 2008). The securitization of 
Palestinian labor persists until today: during the Gaza 
war in 2014, several Palestinians were fired after ex-
pressing anti-Zionist views or critiques of the Israeli 
military on social media (Kashti et al. 2014). These 
examples point to the lasting and rooted implication 
of employment being a privilege, contingent upon 
accepting Zionist ideals. They build on the historic 
delineation of Palestinian workers as inferior. Early 
Zionist settlers conceptualized the notion of “Hebrew 
labor,” which has connotations of productivity and 
industriousness, encouraging Jews to only employ 
Jews in order to displace and conquer “Arab labor” 
(Lockman 1996, 38; Shafir 1989). Still used collo-
quially in Israel to imply poor-quality or inadequate 
work, the term “Arab labor” remains a lasting cul-
tural category and political-economic construction. 
Employment and securitization are not incompatible 
or mutually exclusive; they are a manifestation of dis-
courses and practices of development that combine 
liberalism and security (Lazell 2016).
Outsourcing projects profess to rectify irregular-
ities in industrial relations. However, by building an 
alternative structure, they ultimately accommodate 
and capitalize on marginalization. The segregation in-
herent to operational separation is not an unintended 
effect but part of the business strategy.
Gendered Development
Outsourcing to women from minority groups 
and developing countries has been well-documented 
on a global scale, and it has been similarly presented 
in other capitalist contexts as a form of development 
(Nakamura 2014; Vora 2015). Firms have recruited 
women for repetitive jobs, requiring skills typically as-
sociated with secretaries, such as data entry and call 
centers, often referred to as electronic sweatshops. 
Women’s employment on the margins of the global 
tech economy reflects their inferior gendered position 
in labor markets and their symbolic roles as subjects 
of development (Gillard et al. 2008). The gendering 
of labor markets further structures the employment of 
Palestinians under the conditions of operational sepa-
ration: firms fundamentally built on the isolation and 
insecurity of women claim to be intervening for their 
empowerment. In this context, they mutually produce 
Palestinian women as a third world labor force and 
at the same time captives of Arab culture. The model 
of gendered development embraced by outsourcing 
firms is unsurprisingly fraught with contradictions.
Part of their declared developmental aspirations 
is to empower women while accommodating their cul-
tural particularities. According to a mid-level female 
manager at one of the firms I visited, outsourcing 
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firms purport to establish a family-friendly environ-
ment and build “harmony between the home and 
the workplace.” This is part of their self-description 
as agents of development for women and their fami-
lies and, by extension, for the entire community. She 
links the establishment of offices in the periphery to 
this mission of helping Palestinian women find work 
by bringing available jobs to their doorsteps, immers-
ing the firm into their lives. Describing Babcom as a 
“modern firm that is sensitive to tradition” (Sadeh 
2010), its CEO highlights gendered practices, such as 
offering transportation to women to remedy reserva-
tions about commuting to work and limiting encoun-
ters between the genders.
Such practices are billed as a culturally sensi-
tive response to the special needs of the Palestinian 
community, akin to the segregated hubs employing 
ultra-Orthodox Jewish women to avoid mixing. 
Offering employees transportation is depicted as a 
solution, not simply part of a routine benefits package. 
Rather, it is relayed as resulting from cultural sensitiv-
ities and transformed into a highly gendered practice. 
Such a culturist discourse belies another underlying 
structural issue: the lack of a public transportation 
system, a matter discussed in developmental terms 
since the 1960s (New Outlook 1962, 18–19).
The debates over Palestinian women’s employ-
ment take place within an overarching landscape of 
neoliberalism. Development schemes encouraging 
women’s employment concurrently impoverish them 
through increasingly aggressive neoliberal struc-
tures (Sa’ar 2017). Female interlocutors frequently 
chronicled the precarious effects of employers’ cost- 
cutting strategies on their well-being. In fact, one 
person said she is careful not to allow her employer 
to exact more time than the job deserves, arguing 
that otherwise the firm would turn the women into 
“slaves” for the company. Women are thus cognizant 
that firms shroud low wages and poor working con-
ditions in neoliberal ideas of fulfillment and empow-
erment (Sa’ar 2016).
Meanwhile, the Israeli press has focused on 
outsourcing firms hiring female engineers in the 
male-dominated domain of high-tech (e.g., Shehadeh 
2011). It is filled with articles on young Arab engineers 
breaking stereotypes—referring especially to Muslim 
women, with detailed descriptions of their dress codes, 
particularly whether they wear a hijab. This is part of 
a well-known global drive to “save” Muslim women 
(Abu-Lughod 2013, 88). A female programmer re-
called frequent queries from Jewish-Israelis regarding 
whether she is Christian, followed by admiration for 
her work when she reveals she is Muslim. Jokingly, 
she stated that she was not aware that computers were 
forbidden in Islam. In this narrative, Israel’s economy 
appears as a savior of Palestinian women from religion 
and patriarchy, giving them an opportunity to em-
brace science and technology. There is also a gendered 
culturist component affecting ultra-Orthodox Jewish 
women in high-tech: a brief reference to ultra-Or-
thodox women in a survey of outsourcing describes 
their labor as “inexpensive,” and the “modern, well-
equipped offices” as filled with “women wearing reli-
giously-conservative attire of long skirts, long sleeves, 
and head coverings” (Carmel et al. 2014, 418–19).
Firms have focused on nurturing relationships 
with men, whose support is perceived as essential to 
the success of the project. Similar to acquiring consent 
from Arab men for outsourcing endeavors, there is an 
emphasis in the case of ultra-Orthodox Jewish women 
on blessings from rabbis for their employment in 
high-tech (Frenkel and Wasserman 2016), ultimately 
reinforcing power dynamics and social hierarchies 
pertaining to gender. This arrangement is unsurpris-
ing, as the use of patriarchal values and motifs was 
central to subcontracting in textiles (Drori 2000).
Although they emphasize the empowerment of 
women as career-oriented individuals, outsourcing 
firms reproduce, accommodate, and internalize pa-
triarchal structures in their bureaucratic apparatuses. 
The reliance on younger women is itself linked to the 
structure of the gendered labor market: women com-
prise a secondary labor market within the secondary 
labor market of Palestinians in Israel’s periphery, and 
therefore their wages are even lower and more inse-
cure than wages of Palestinian men. Only around 26 
percent of Palestinian women are employed, although 
they are generally well-educated (Hamdan-Saliba and 
Nicola 2015). Tapping into this market is thus highly 
strategic for outsourcing firms. Outsourcing proclaims 
to be more “modern, developed, and appropriate for 
our time,” as Imad Telhami, Babcom’s CEO, told me 
in an interview, but firms are grafted with relics of its 
predecessor, subcontracting giant Delta, using a gen-
dered and precarious workforce in the periphery to 
magnify profits and bypass the high cost of labor in 
the center.
Peacemaking
Domestic outsourcing firms have embraced 
peacemaking as part of their developmental cultures, 
a discourse that ultimately establishes these firms as 
spaces of “anti-politics” (Ferguson 1994). Disregarding 
the everyday separation inherent in outsourcing, peace-
making emphasizes small-scale professional encounters 
between Arabs and Jews as leading to coexistence and 
underscores the supposedly positive social benefits of 
Palestinian employment.
Outsourcing firms receive financial support from 
the state, as well as liberal organizations inside and 
outside Israel promoting Arab-Jewish coexistence. 
Emerging in the 1990s as part of the Oslo Accords 
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and coinciding with Israel’s increased integration 
into the global economy, peacemaking has morphed 
into a discursive device and an industry (Hanieh 
2002; Stein 2008). The prominence of integration as 
a form of peacemaking for Palestinians in Israel was 
not a side effect of the Oslo process but an objective 
of the agreement, which sought to “create distinct 
experiences of politics among different segments of 
Palestinians under Israeli rule” (Pasquetti 2012, 104). 
Peacemaking prioritizes economic engagement over 
political reconciliation, in line with a depoliticized 
neoliberal logic. Entangled with securitization, this 
process reduces political violence to an expression 
of economic marginalization, thereby elevating lib-
eral ideals of development and integration within the 
arithmetic of conflict resolution (Duffield 2001).
The model espoused by domestic outsourcing 
firms is built on creating an anti-political space, which 
is crucial for their operations (see Ferguson 1994). 
Conceding, for instance, that the 2014 war in Gaza 
made business difficult, one manager depicted it pre-
dominantly as an interruption to the flow of daily life. 
Similarly, in a public interview, Telhami made it clear 
that he is not interested in taking part in the political 
discussions raging throughout the country, reiterating 
his stance that he “does not talk politics, is not involved 
in politics and does not pretend to understand it” 
(TheMarker 2010). According to this philosophy, the 
workplace deals with questions other than the existen-
tial political ones, casting politics as emotional, rather 
than productive, and thus irrelevant in the realm of 
business. The Nazareth Industrial Park, marketed on 
its website as a “model of Arab-Jewish cooperation,” 
is also linked to economic peace via constructive en-
gagement. Its founder, Stef Wertheimer, describes 
work as a distracting force from politics and violence. 
“When people are working together,” he argues, “they 
have no time for nonsense. They are too tired at night 
to commit terrorist acts” (Manor 2004). Employment 
is portrayed as a civilizing tool that can produce 
loyal subjects, combat radicalization, and save young 
Palestinians from fundamentalism—a perspective that 
attaches an overall morality to work.
These anti-political stances have themselves 
transformed into a political statement, as in all forms 
of anti-politics (Ferguson 1994). Outsourced firms 
acquire significance beyond merely being places of 
employment. They become symbolic of a space within 
Israel for Palestinian citizens, a space of disjuncture. 
As “Arab start-ups,” they are viewed as finally giving 
Arabs a place within the so-called Start-up Nation, 
albeit on the margins. For example, Pitango, a large 
venture capital fund, launched its own Arab subsidiary 
called al-Bawadir in 2010. It is run by Chemi Peres, 
the son of former president Shimon Peres, who was 
a major supporter of economic peace and domestic 
outsourcing specifically. Supported by top govern-
ment officials, al-Bawadir is investing around 40 per-
cent of its capital in tech firms. Chemi Peres describes 
“connectivity” as key for appealing to the (Palestinian) 
youth in Israel, stating, “Many young Israeli-Arabs 
will tell you: Forget about the Palestinians. We want 
to be part of Israel” (Behar 2013). Employment in 
outsourcing firms in Israel’s periphery is thus sold as 
creating this opportunity to “be part of Israel,” which 
entails participating in its economy—if only on the 
periphery.
While discussing the agenda of peacemaking, 
one of my interlocutors jokingly recalled her partic-
ipation in “peace workshops” in the Galilee in the 
past. Emphasizing face-to-face discussions between 
Palestinians and Israelis as a form of peacemaking, 
these workshops flourished during the 1990s, spon-
sored by governments, private entities, or NGOs. She 
described both settings as awkward and unintuitive, 
evoking feelings of discomfort and dislocation. Both 
contexts require controlled and rigid participation, 
disciplined by mechanisms of surveillance—a teacher 
or a supervisor—ensuring the sanitized peace envi-
ronment is not undercut. They revolve around the 
aesthetic of peace yet entail minimal meaningful en-
gagement, with political sentiments either overlooked 
or reduced to a technical issue.
The discourse of peacemaking aligns with Israel’s 
self-depiction as a liberal and multi-cultural space. 
According to Khalil Gharra, this image is deployed to 
“cover up its various forms of subjugation, repression, 
and colonization” and “whitewash Israel’s image in 
front of the world, to prove to the world that it looks 
after Palestinian citizens, helps them, and facilitates 
an environment that embraces their ambitions and 
creative thoughts, that it provides a space for innova-
tion” (Gharra, 2016). This dialectic of development 
and dispossession is fundamental to the operations of 
domestic outsourcing, illustrating their complex inter-
twinement in the digital age.
Conclusion: On the Politics of Cheaper Labor
Kiva [an international development non-profit 
providing loans] originally saw Israel as a devel-
oped economy, a member of the OECD. It took 
us a couple of years to convince them that not 
all of Israel is like that. We persuaded them that 
some sections of Israeli society—notably Arab 
and Bedouin women—are actually Third World. 
It’s not a political issue. (Bentley 2011)
The above quotation comes from the Managing 
Director of the Koret Israel Economic Development 
Fund, an Israeli nonprofit (and recipient of a loan 
from Kiva), discussing a micro-finance project tar-
geting Arab women in Israel. The juxtaposition aptly 
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reflects the way Palestinians in Israel are constructed: 
third world, conjuring images of poverty, disenfran-
chisement, powerlessness—but “it’s not political.” 
This dichotomy, in which specific groups are rendered 
“third world” in Israel’s industrialized economy, re-
sembles the terminology of international develop-
ment globally (Escobar 1995). Within the microcosm 
of domestic outsourcing, the practice of operational 
separation and developmental discourses both mobi-
lize and perpetuate categories of inferiority, which, as 
described above, contain implications for the securiti-
zation of labor, gender stratification, and anti-politics. 
This illustrates the ways in which developmental proj-
ects build on and empower not only neoliberalism but 
also segregation and colonialism.
Connotations of inferiority pervade the vocabu-
lary of the outsourced high-tech industry and shape 
material processes. Jimmy Levy (founder of the 
Nazareth-based high-tech firm Galil Software and co-
founder of al-Bawadir) describes Palestinians as “an 
emerging market within Israel’s developed economy” 
(Elis 2014). At a roundtable at an Israeli business con-
ference held in 2012 discussing high-tech, Danziger 
asserted that they can compete with offshore centers, 
such as those in India (Shelah 2012). Cheaper labor is 
at heart a political construct, rooted in precarity: the 
lower cost of labor is fundamentally linked to the pro-
duction and reproduction of Arab labor as inferior. As 
an overlooked terrain of the state and market engage-
ment with Palestinians of 1948, outsourcing projects 
illustrate the colonial dynamics of inclusion and exclu-
sion in the liberal settler state. Although they keep re-
lations static, they are not merely a policy of inaction, 
rather a specific mechanism of capitalist development 
ensuring that Palestinians are circumscribed as cheaper 
labor-power.
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